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In his most recent book, Hadiz wants to explain the different trajectories of Islamic populism in 
Indonesia, Turkey and Egypt. All three countries have in common that politics in recent years 
have seen “the mobilisation and homogenisation of a range of disparate grievances of the ‘masses’ 
against identified ‘elites’” (p. 3) couched in Islamic terms. 
 
The three countries differ, however, to the degree this Islamic populism has gained access to 
formal politics. Unlike in Turkey, “representatives of Islamic politics” have remained confined to 
the margins of the political arena in Indonesia. In Egypt, meanwhile, politicians pushing an 
“Islamic agenda” have been vocal and visible in society for decades but failed to maintain power 
after they had gained access to the state in the context of the Arab Spring.  
 
Hadiz puts forward two interrelated arguments for why this is the case: One, Islamic populism is 
a reaction by certain groups to their political and economic marginalization as a result of 
capitalist advancement. Two, Islamic populism has followed different political trajectories 
because cross-class alliances underpinning it vary in both degree and composition from one 
country to another.  
 
These arguments are discussed in more detail throughout the book, which is structured as 
follows: In Chapter 2 Hadiz argues that Islamic populism is no different from other forms of 
populism to the extent that it is “very much connected to social contradictions intimately related 
to participation in the processes of neoliberal globalisation” (p. 4). In other words, the spread of 
capitalism triggers different class alliances, which subsequently shape political trajectories of 
Islamic populism. Chapter 3 examines the roots of Islamic populism in Indonesia, Turkey and 
Egypt. In Chapter 4, the main argument is presented in more detail, comparing the social bases of 
Islamic populism in the three countries. Chapter 5 looks at the different strategies and political 
vehicles employed by Islamic populists, including political parties, mass movements and 
“terrorism.” Chapter 6 provides a description of the Darul Islam, which is one of the oldest Islamic 
movements in Indonesia. How the Darul Islam movement has adapted to changing political 
contexts since it emerged in 1945 over time therefore contributes to our understanding of how 
Islamist populism is shaped by social forces, Hadiz argues. Chapter 7 examines the relationship 
between Islamic populism and electoral democracy while Chapter 8 wants to identify the 
circumstances under which Islamic populism accepts and rejects market forces. Chapter 9 
discusses avenues for future research on Islamic populism.  
 
Hadiz reaches three main conclusions: One, Islamic populism is a modern phenomenon, despite 
its portrayal in popular media and some of the academic literature as a backward-looking, 
inward-oriented political force. Two, the political trajectories of Islamic populism vary to a great 
degree between countries. Hadiz therefore disagrees with works on post-Islamism, “which is 
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generally presented as political adaptation in a single direction: towards ‘a more rights-centred 
and inclusive outlook that favors a civil/ secular state operating within a pious society’” (Bayat 
2013: 29 cited in Hadiz 2016, p. 5). Three, economic structures are important determinants of 
Islamic populism and should therefore be given more prominence in analyses of Islamic politics 
around the world.  
 
Mainstream political science based on quantitative data analyses has failed to predict populist 
revolts as diverse as Donald J. Trump’s victoryi in the presidential elections in the USA in 2016 
and the Arab Spring in 2011.ii 
 
Quantitative studies’ weak explanatory power has shown the need for theoretically innovative, 
qualitative in-depth research on the conditions that facilitate political populism. While Hadiz’ 
research is therefore timely, the book unfortunately offers neither a sound theoretical framework 
nor much in terms of empirical insights that would help readers to better understand Islamic 
populism. The first two findings of the book are not particularly original or profound while the 
evidence presented in support of the third finding is rather confusing. One, scholars have shown 
some time ago for both Indonesiaiii and other Muslim-majority countriesiv that Islamic politics are 
a modern, forward-looking phenomenon. Two, scholars have also pointed out before that Islamic 
politics do not necessarily move in the direction of support for a secular nation statev and that 
variance in Islamic politics exists both between vi  and within countries vii  Three, and most 
problematic about the book under review here, the Marxist theoretical framework on which 
Hadiz relies does not align with most of the empirical evidence presented throughout the book. 
 
Remember that Hadiz’s first argument said that Islamic populism is triggered by “advances of 
capitalist economies,” and “contradictions intimately related to participation in the process of 
globalization” (p. 4), while his second argument was that trajectories of Islamic populism are 
shaped by different cross-class alliances. Hadiz’ book provides ample evidence that “the exclusion 
of the ummah from taking part in the process [of capitalist accumulation] on a larger scale” (p.38) 
and a “perpetual inability to make use of the formal institutions of politics and the market as 
effective arenas of contestation” (p. 116) triggered populist movements under the banner of 
Islam in Indonesia, Egypt and Turkey.  
 
While this is in line with Hadiz’ theoretical framework, Hadiz then presents evidence for his 
second argument that seems to be more in line with classic movement theory and its core 
argument about how states, that is, political conditions, shape movements, not anonymous social 
processes associated with economic change identified by Hadiz as the main reason for different 
trajectories of Islamic activism around the globe. 
 
For instance, Hadiz shows how in Indonesia, Egypt and Turkey “modernization” and “state-
building” was led by “states under the control of secular nationalist elites that sometimes made 
room for but at other times resolutely peripheralised social interests claiming to represent the 
ummah” (p. 79). Furthermore, Hadiz explains that a revolution under the banner of Islam did not 
occur in Indonesia, Egypt and Turkey due to the fact that there are no powerful clergies in any of 
these three countries. In addition, the state was able to prevent alliances between leftist and 
Islamist forces (p. 80). The state, in other words, has been “a major impediment to the 
advancement of the ummah [in Indonesia]” (p. 110). At the same time, “when repression against 
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the social agents of Islamic politics reached its height in the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt was starting to immerse itself in the Mubarak-era system of electoral politics. At the same 
time, some of the political precursors of the AKP in Turkey were starting to benefit from the 
‘highly controlled opening to religious groups’ that was then being initiated by a state controlled 
by military Kemalists and some of their technocratic allies…” (p. 110).viii Similarly, Hadiz writes 
that the variety in Islamic activism in Indonesia is “…partly attributable to the social effects of 
New Order suppression – leading to the requirement that its activists develop strategies, 
sometimes highly localised, to cope with a harshly authoritarian regime…” (p. 117). In a similar 
vein, explaining the absence of a central command structure in many Islamic movements, Hadiz 
states: “The reason is simple: these organisations developed in relation to nationally defined 
battles…” (p. 144). There are numerous other passages in the book that suggest the importance 
of political, not economic conditions as the decisive factor in shaping the contours of Islamic 
populism.  
 
In contrast, Hadiz presents insufficient empirical material in support of his claim that economic 
conditions account for the variance in Islamic populism. For instance, claims that the Islamization 
of former Communist areas in Central Java was made possible by “profound changes in the 
conditions of material life in the locality” (p. 129) or that Islamic populism is shaped by “the 
specific kinds of social interests that have converged, albeit with inevitably varying levels of 
internal coherence, within the multi-class alliances that sociologically enable the new Islamic 
populism”(p. 138) are not supported by empirical evidence.  
 
In short, while Hadiz claims that economic conditions matter for our understanding of variance in 
Islamic populism, the evidence he presents throughout his book suggest that political factors 
determine why and how Islamic populism gains political salience and influence. Rather than 
relying on Marx to explain variance in Islamic activism in the context of neoliberal globalization, 
Hadiz’ argument seems to be closer to scholars such as Kimmeldorf, who, in his account of why 
labour unionists in the United States of America became fierce ideologues on the West Coast while 
labour unions on the East Coast became politically conservative rackets, has shown that the 
political environment explains for differences in social mobilization triggered by capitalist 
advancement.ix 
 
i Hailed as the “most influential political-science book in recent memory” by The Economist in 2016 (The 
Economist, “Pushback” 5th March 2016), Martin Cohen, David Karol, Hans Noel and John Zaller’s The Party 
Decides: Presidential Nominations before and after Reform (Chicago: Chicago Studies in American Politics, 
2008) claimed that political parties guide voters away from populist politicians and towards “acceptable 
nominees.”  
ii Jeff Goodwin. “Why we were surprised (again) by the Arab Spring,” Swiss Political Science Review 17, 4 
(2011): 452-6. 
iii R. Michael Feener. Shari’a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary 
Aceh, Indonesia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
iv  Charles Tripp. Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
v  For Indonesia, see, for instance, Masdar Hilmy. Islamism and Democracy in Indonesia: Piety and 
Pragmatism (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010). A similar argument has been made more recently by Jeremy 
Menchik. Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016). For other Muslim-majority countries, see Gunes M. Tezcur, “The moderation theory revisited: 
The case of Islamic political actors,” Party Politics 16 (2010): 69-88.  
_______________________________ 
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vi Alison Pargeter “Localism and Radicalization in North Africa,” International Affairs 85 (September 2009): 
1031-44. 
vii  Christine Fair “Islamic Militancy in Pakistan,” (July 2009) Available at http://tinyurl.com/coeyqu6 
(Accessed 21 June 2017). 
viii For other empirical evidence in Hadiz book that suggests the importance of political, not economic 
conditions, for our understanding of varying trajectories of Islamic populism, see, for instance, pp. 64, 117, 
139, 144. 
ix Howard Kimmeldorf. Reds or Rackets? The Making of Radical and Conservative Unions on the Waterfront 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988). 
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The intersection of memory, power and heritage is assuredly fertile, though no means untrodden, 
ground for a monograph on contemporary Thailand. Nidhi Eoseewong, Maurizo Pellegi, 
Thongchai Winichakul and Craig Reynolds have demonstrated the importance of these elements 
in understanding contemporary Thai identities in their historical analyses. Heritage and Identity 
in Contemporary Thailand approaches this vast subject from the perspective of architecture and 
tourism studies, bringing together a diverse collection of case studies ranging from the economics 
of an Isaan village handicraft market to the entirety of the Bangkok khlong system. The book is 
divided into four parts; an introduction, a section of six chapters on heritage and memory, a 
section entitled heritage, memory and inequality (also six chapters) and a conclusion. The 
majority of the book comprises the 12 case studies found in the “internal chapters” of the book. 
Often containing, great hunks of evocative descriptive writing, they validate King’s assertion that 
‘heritage is not always about grand monuments and national treasures’ (p. 3). 
 
 A standout chapter about the Japanese colonization of Thailand concisely brings together several 
themes central to the entire volume. The role of memory, and of course forgetting, are explored 
in relation to the sites of WWII. The vexed question of heritage ownership is also discussed. 
Whose heritage is the death railway of Kanchanburi, or the bridge over the river Kwai? Thailand’s, 
Japan’s, Australia’s, the romusha of Java’s? Can adventurer Yamada Nagamasa be considered a 
lieux de mémoire? How has Japan’s modernization affected the physical and cultural landscape of 
Bangkok? Some wonderful description is also to be found. A thought provoking chapter about the 
changing character of Sukhumvit has a wonderful digression on the informalisation of formal 
places. Describing a now-‘slum building’ on Sukhumvit 71; ‘clearly this is “formal” in that its 
developers would have had some form of development approval (however obtained and from 
what “authority”), it is owned and it pays taxes and enjoys municipal connections. It is also 
informal as poor occupants have adapted its space and extended outwards from its façade in a 
mélange of new screens, residual wreckage, old signboards of either surviving or departed 
enterprises and other tactics to seize on a modicum of privacy and additional space‘ (pp. 167-8).  
 
However, this chapter—like others in the collection—have a tendency to romanticize anterior 
aspects of Thai life over modernized forms. After a sniffy account of the gentrification of Phra 
Khanong, the author remarks that the market sells ‘clothing better and cheaper than anywhere 
